This paper revisits the important issue of whether economic development promotes democracy by using the system-GMM method, which is superior to the di¤erence-GMM method when dependent variables (democracy in this paper) are highly persistent over time. With the same data set as that of Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2008), we …nd that the system-GMM estimated coe¢ cient of income per capita is positive and highly statistically signi…cant, in sharp contrast to the di¤erence-GMM results reported by Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2008) . Furthermore, employing the U.S. and Colombia as an example, we …nd that much of the di¤erence in democracy across countries can be explained by the corresponding di¤erence in income per capita.
1 Introduction (copied from Table 2 of Bond, 2002) , the di¤erence-GMM estimate of is 0:484 (or 0:226) when the true value is 0:8 (or 0:9), whereas the corresponding system-GMM estimate is 0:810 (or 0:941).
Democracy is indeed highly persistent over time. In Table 2 , we present various estimation results of the …rst-order auto-regression of democracy. The OLS estimated coe¢ cient is 0:866, which is usually considered the upper bound, whereas the panel …xed e¤ect estimated coe¢ cient is 0:419, which is often considered the lower bound. The most valid estimate is 0:817 obtained from the t 3 system-GMM estimation, as it satis…es the identi…cation assumptions implied by the insigni…cant Hansen J test and the insigni…cant di¤erence Hansen J test. Because of the highly persistent nature of democracy (i.e., with the AR(1) coe¢ cient being 0:817), the coe¢ cient of the lagged democracy in the AJRY (2008) di¤erence-GMM estimation is only weakly identi…ed and biased, causing the estimated coe¢ cient of income per capita to be biased or even misleading. In this paper, we use the system GMM estimation method to revisit the impact of income per capita on democracy with the same data set as that employed by AJRY (2008) (downloaded from the AER web site).
We …nd that under the system-GMM estimation, the estimated coe¢ cient of income per capita becomes positive and highly statistically signi…cant, in sharp contrast to the results AJRY (2008) obtain from the di¤erence-GMM method. We then conduct a series of robustness checks: …ve exercises mirroring those of AJRY (2008) (an alternative measure of democracy, di¤erent sub-samples, additional controls, external instrumental variables for income per capita, and longer sample periods and longer time intervals for variable measurement), one exercise the same as that conducted by AJRY (2009) (differential impacts across countries with di¤erent initial degrees of democracy), one exercise similar to that of Boix (2011) (di¤erent sample periods), one exercise including the additional controls used by Boix and Stokes (2003) , Boix (2011) , and Miller (forthcoming), and a new exercise (extending the analysis to more recent years). In all these exercises, we …nd that the coe¢ cient of income per capita is always positive and statistically signi…cant. As a further robustness check, we follow AJRY (2008) in calculating the extent to which our estimation results explain variations in the degree of democracy across countries. Using Colombia as an example, we …nd that if we elevate income per capita in Colombia to the level of the United States in 2000, our estimation results explain almost all the di¤erence in democracy between these two countries. Overall, this study lends strong support to the modernization hypothesis that economic development promotes democracy (Lipset, 1959) .
Several other recent studies have challenged the robustness of the results of AJRY (2008). Boix (2011) overturns the main results of AJRY (2008) by extending the data to the early nineteenth century, when hardly any countries were democratic, and by adopting a broader theory of development and international relations. Benhabib, Corvalan, and Spiegel (2011) also re-establish the positive impact of development on democracy by utilizing newer income data and using estimation methods to deal with the problem of measures of democracy being censored. Our paper di¤ers from these two studies by using the same data sets as those employed by AJRY (2008), but we reverse the results of AJRY (2008) by adopting the system GMM estimation method, which is considered more suitable than the panel …xed e¤ects estimation or di¤erence-GMM estimation method when the dependent variable (i.e., democracy in this paper) is highly persistent over time.
Our paper is also related to the literature regarding the exogenous theory of democracy (i.e., that development has a positive impact on the stability of a democratic country) versus the endogenous theory of democracy (i.e., that development has a positive impact on the transition of an autocratic country to a democratic one). Przeworski and Limongi (1997) and Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000) …nd that development helps democratic countries become less likely to revert to autocracy (i.e., providing support for the exogenous theory of democracy), but it has a limited e¤ect on the democratization of autocratic countries (i.e., no supporting the endogenous theory of democracy). Boix and Stokes (2003) , however, …nd evidence supporting both the exogenous and endogenous theories of democracy by both extending the data to the early nineteenth century and including more control variables. 3 Similar to Boix and Stokes (2003), we o¤er evidence supporting both the endogenous and exogenous theories of democracy by adopting the system-GMM estimation method to examine the same data set as that used by AJRY (2008, 2009) , and the extended data set used by Boix and Stokes (2003) and Boix (2011) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data set and model speci…cations employed for empirical analysis. Section 3 presents our empirical …ndings. The paper concludes in Section 4.
Data and Model Speci…cation
The data set used in this paper is the same as that examined by AJRY (2008) (downloaded from the American Economic Review web site 4 ). The main measure of democracy is the Freedom House Political Rights Index 5 augmented by Bollen's data. 6 As a robustness check, we use the Composite Polity Index 7 from the Polity IV project as an alternative measure of democracy. Both the Freedom House measure of democracy and the Polity measure of democracy are normalized to [0; 1], with a higher value indicating a higher degree of democracy. Information about income per capita comes from the Penn World Table for the post-war period and from the study of Maddison (2010) for the pre-war period beginning in 1820.
Following AJRY (2008), we use a dynamic panel data model to investigate the causal impact of income per capita on democracy:
where d it is the degree of democracy for country i in period t; d it 1 is the lagged democracy variable used to account for the persistence of democracy over time; y it 1 , the main variable of interest in this study, is the lagged log income per capita; X it 1 is a vector of control variables; t denotes the unobserved time e¤ect controlling for common shocks originated from macroeconomic, political, or technological sources; i is the …xed e¤ect which controls for the unobserved time-invariant country-speci…c characteristics; and " it is the error term. To account for possible heteroskedasticity, standard errors are clustered at the country level.
To deal with the correlation between i and d it 1 in (1), a …rst-di¤erence transformation can be used to purge the country …xed e¤ect i :
where is the …rst-di¤erence operator, e.g.,
; " it ) 6 = 0 due to the fact that d it 1 is a function of " it 1 , the OLS estimation of (2) produces a biased estimate of ; and as a consequence, the estimate of -the main parameter of interest -is also biased. 4 Web site: http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=3 5 The Freedom House Political Rights Index ranges from 1 to 7 with a lower value indicating a higher degree of democracy. As the …rst year of the Freedom House Political Rights Index is 1972, AJRY (2008) use the value of democracy in 1972 for that of 1970 in their …ve-year interval analysis. 6 Bollen's data allow us to extend the …ve-year interval analysis from 1970 to 1950. 7 The Composite Polity Index ranges from 10 to 10; with a higher value indicating a higher degree of democracy.
For the consistent estimation of (2), Arellano and Bond (1991) use the di¤erence-GMM method …rst proposed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) in which d it 2 and all the further available lags are used as instruments for d it 1 given there is no second-order serial correlation in " it . The validity of the proposed instruments can be justi…ed by assuming E (" it ) = E (" it d it j ) = 0 for j = 1; 2; :::t 1. This corresponds to the following orthogonality condition for (2):
where i = ( " i3 ; " i4 ; :::; " iT ) 0 and Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest using the AR(2) test to check whether there is any second-order serial correlation of " it , and recommend using the Hansen J test to check for possible violation of the orthogonality condition (3).
However, as pointed out in the Introduction, the di¤erence-GMM method su¤ers from a severe weak instrument problem when the dependent variable is highly persistent over time. This renders both point estimates and hypothesis tests unreliable (Staiger and Stock, 1997; Stock and Wright, 2000; Stock, Wright and Yogo, 2002). Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) argue that when the dependent variable is highly persistent over time, the di¤erence of the lagged dependent variable has more explanatory power for the lagged dependent variable than that of the available lags of the dependent variable for the di¤erence of the lagged dependent variable. Hence, they propose augmenting the di¤erence-GMM method with the original level equation (1) in which the lagged …rst-di¤erenced dependent variable is used as the instrument for the lagged dependent variable. This brings a set of additional orthogonality conditions as follows:
the validity of which can be tested by the di¤erence Hansen J test as proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) . This method is referred to as the "system-GMM". Given that the degree of democracy in a country is highly persistent over time, we plan to revisit the impact of income per capita on democracy using the system-GMM method.
It is worth noting that as the instrument count grows with the time dimension T , the Hansen J test for the orthogonality condition (3) or the di¤erence Hansen J test for the orthogonality condition (4) might su¤er from notable size distortion as documented by Andersen and Sorensen (1996) , Bowsher (2002) , and Roodman (2009b). Roodman (2009b) also discusses other symptoms of instrument proliferation studied in the literature such as over…tting endogenous variables, imprecise estimates of the GMM optimal weighting matrix, and bias in two-step standard errors. Extensive simulation studies conducted by Roodman (2009b) suggest that collapsing instruments, a way to reduce the instrument count, tends to mitigate …nite sample bias and greatly increase the ability of the Hansen J and di¤erence Hansen J tests to detect violation of orthogonality conditions. When reporting our empirical results, we follow this practice by adding the estimates obtained from collapsing instruments.
Empirical Findings

Main Results
Columns 1-2 of Table 3 summarize our system-GMM estimation results regarding the impact of income per capita on democracy (i.e., the Freedom House measure of democracy) for the 1960-2000 period, 8 where both the dependent and independent variables are measured over a …ve-year interval. 9 For ease of comparison, the results from the pooled OLS, panel …xed e¤ect and di¤erence-GMM estimations are copied from those of AJRY (2008) in Columns 3-5 of Table 3 .
As shown in Column 3, the pooled OLS estimation gives a positive and statistically signi…cant estimated coe¢ cient of income per capita, consistent with the …ndings of Barro (1997 Barro ( , 1999 . However, as discovered by AJRY (2008), the coe¢ cient of income per capita becomes statistically insigni…cant, but positive, once the country …xed e¤ects are controlled for (Column 4), and it becomes signi…cantly negative under the di¤erence-GMM estimation (Column 5). Interestingly, we …nd that the estimated coe¢ cient of income per capita reverts to a positive and highly statistically signi…cant value under the system-GMM estimation (Column 1).
Our system-GMM estimation is valid, as the insigni…cance of the AR(2) test result implies no second-order serial correlation of the error term, the insigni…cance of the Hansen J test result suggests the satisfaction of orthogonality condition (3) , and the insigni…cance of the di¤erence Hansen J test result implies the satisfaction of orthogonality condition (4). More importantly, the estimated coe¢ cient of lagged democracy (0:574) is rather high, lying well between the lower limit of …xed e¤ects estimate (0:379) and the upper limit of pooled OLS estimate (0:706). The high persistence of the degree of democracy in a country over time is expected to lend more credence to the results of the system-GMM estimation than it is to those of the di¤erence-GMM estimation (Bond, 2002) .
As a way of checking whether or not our system-GMM estimation results make sense, we conduct a counterfactual analysis investigating whether variations in the degree of democracy across countries can be explained by their di¤erences in income per capita. We follow AJRY (2008) by comparing the U.S. with Colombia as an illustration. The …rst two pillars in Figure  1 are the democracy scores (measured by the Freedom House index) of the U.S. and Colombia in 2000, respectively. Given that our estimated coe¢ -cient of income per capita is 0:102 (Column 1 of Table 3 ), the short-run impact of income per capita on democracy in Colombia would be an increase of (10:41 8:59) 0:102 = 0:187 if Colombia's log income per capita were lifted from 8:59 to the level of the U.S. (i.e., 10:41). The long-run impact of income per capita on democracy in Colombia would be an increase of 0:187 (1 0:574) = 0:438, where 0:574 is the coe¢ cient of the lagged democracy (Column 1 of Table 3 ). These two degrees of democracy for Colombia are presented in pillars 3 and 4 of Figure 1 , respectively. It is interesting to note that the height of pillar 4 is almost the same as that of pillar 1, indicating that the di¤erence in income per capita between Colombia and the United States explains most of the di¤erence in democracy between the two countries.
To check the robustness of our system-GMM estimates, we also report results from the system-GMM estimation with collapsing instruments, aimed at alleviating the instrument proliferation problem in the system-GMM estimation. Using collapsing instruments barely changes either the magnitude or statistical signi…cance of the system-GMM estimates (Column 2 of Table  3 ). Meanwhile, the system-GMM estimates with collapsing instruments pass the various speci…cation tests: the Hansen J test, the di¤erence Hansen J test, and the AR(2) test.
Robustness checks
In the following section, we conduct a series of robustness checks: …ve exercises the same as those conducted by AJRY (2008) 
Alternative measure of democracy. In the main analysis above, we use the Freedom House measure of democracy augmented by Bollen's data, which cover only the post-1950 period. As a robustness check, we use an alternative measure of democracy, Polity IV, which provides information for all independent countries starting in 1800. The system-GMM estimation results obtained using the Polity measure of democracy are reported in Column 1 of Table 4 . We …nd a positive and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient of income per capita. This result is consistent with our earlier system-GMM results (Column 1 of Table 3 ) and contrast sharply with the results of the panel …xed e¤ects and di¤erence-GMM estimations reported by AJRY (2008).
Di¤erent sub-samples. In Columns 2-3 of Table 4 , we present our system-GMM estimation results for two sub-samples to address two possible sampling concerns in line with the approach of AJRY (2008). First, we focus on a balanced sample of countries from 1970 to 2000 to make sure our results are not a¤ected by the entry and exit of countries during the sample period. Second, we focus on a sub-sample excluding former socialist countries to alleviate the concern that our results could be a¤ected by the inclusion of these countries, which experienced a surge in democracy yet underwent signi…cant economic decline in the late 1980s and the 1990s. In both subsamples, the system-GMM estimated coe¢ cients of income per capita are positive and statistically signi…cant, consistent with our main …ndings but in contrast to the negative and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cients reported by AJRY (2008).
Additional Controls. Next, we investigate whether our results are a¤ected by some covariates that may a¤ect both income per capita and democracy. Speci…cally, we include in Column 4 of Table 4 the logarithm of population, age structure, and education in line with AJRY (2008), and we further include in Column 5 of Table 4 urbanization, the number of previous democratic breakdowns, international order, and the growth rate External instruments for income. Thus far, we have instrumented income per capita by its double lag as do AJRY (2008). As a further robustness check, we follow AJRY (2008) in using two distinct external instruments for income per capita: the past savings rate and predicted income based on the trade-share-weighted average income of other countries. 10 Our system-GMM estimation results are reported in Columns 6-7 of Table 4 . Again, we …nd that the system-GMM estimated coe¢ cients of income per capita are positive and signi…cant, in contrast to the negative and signi…cant coe¢ cients under the corresponding di¤erence-GMM estimations reported by AJRY (2008).
Longer sample periods and longer time intervals for variable measurement. Thus far, we have used the data employed by AJRY (2008), which cover the 1950-2000 period. As more data have since become available, we …rst extend the sample period to 2010. Speci…cally, we obtain data on income per capita from Penn World Table 7 .0 11 and on democracy from Freedom House. 12 This enables us to include more countries in the analysis, yielding an increase of 47 countries in the system-GMM estimation. This allows us to make sure our earlier results are not driven by the particular sample period and the particular set of countries examined. It is reassuring to …nd that income per capita continues to have a positive and statistically signi…cant impact on democracy in the system-GMM estimation (Column 8 of Table 4 ).
Second, using the Polity IV measure of democracy enables us to further extend the …rst year of the sample period from 1950 to 1820, while data on income per capita from 1820 to 1950 are obtained from the study of Maddison (2010) . 13 In Column 1 of Table 5 , we report the system-GMM estimation results for the 1820-2008 sample period using a 5-year interval 10 For the rationales of these two instruments, please refer to the original paper of AJRY (2008 Table 5 , we investigate the impact of income per capita on democracy using longer time intervals of 10 and 25 years, respectively. The coe¢ cient of income per capita remains positive and statistically signi…cant. Our results lend further support to Boix (2011) , who highlights the importance of including the earlier waves of democratization in investigating the impact of income per capita on democracy. 14 Moreover, the coe¢ cients are much larger than those obtained in the shorter time interval (i.e., the …ve-year interval), presumably because greater changes can be Table 6 . It is clear that other than during the …rst time period (1820-1849), the coe¢ cient of income per capita on democracy is always positive and statistically signi…cant, consistent with our aforementioned main results. 15 Di¤erential impacts across countries with di¤erent initial degrees of democracy. There is a debate regarding whether the impact of income per capita on democracy may depend on the initial degree of democracy (see, for example, Przeworski and Limongi, 1997; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi, 2000; Boix and Stokes, 2003) . Speci…cally, for a country with a low initial degree of democracy, an increase in income per capita may facilitate its transition to democracy (called the endogenous theory in the literature). Meanwhile, for a country with a high initial degree of democracy, an increase in income per capita may make it less likely to revert to dictatorship (called the exogenous theory in the literature).
To investigate the validity of these two theories, we modify (1) as follows (i.e., in the same manner as AJRY (2009)
where it 1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if d it 1 is below the sample mean and 0 otherwise; EN DO captures the e¤ect of income per capita on democracy for countries in which the degree of democracy is below the sample mean (the exogenous theory); and EXO captures the e¤ect of income per capita on democracy for countries in which the degree of democracy is above the sample mean (the endogenous theory). The system-GMM estimation results are reported in Table 7 . It is found that EXO is positive and statistically signi…cant, supporting the exogenous theory and consistent with the …ndings of Przeworski and Limongi (1997) and Boix and Stokes (2003) . Meanwhile, EN DO is also positive and statistically signi…cant, supporting the endogenous theory and consistent with the …ndings of Boix and Stokes (2003) . Moreover, these results are consistent with our aforementioned results, but are in sharp contrast to those reported by AJRY (2009).
Collapsed system-GMM. Recall that in the main analysis (Section 3.1) we use collapsing instruments as a check of the validity of the system-GMM estimation. Here, we conduct a similar analysis for all the above robustness checks and …nd that our results are qualitatively the same. For details, see Tables A, B , and C of the Appendix.
It is interesting to note that there are certain cases where the speci…cation tests (i.e., the Hansen J test and the di¤erence Hansen J test) fail. However, these are also the cases where the di¤erence-GMM estimations also fail the speci…cation test (i.e., the Hansen J test). Moreover, the estimated coe¢ cient of income per capita obtained using the system-GMM estimation with the full instrument set is qualitatively the same as those obtained using collapsing instruments. These results suggest that our system-GMM estimation results are not a¤ected by the instrument proliferation problem.
Conclusion
The seminal work of AJRY (2008) on the unimportance of income per capita to democracy has caused quite a stir in the economics and political science community. The identi…cation of AJRY (2008) relies on the use of the di¤erence-GMM method; however, this method su¤ers from the weak instrument problem when the dependent variable (i.e., the degree of democracy) is highly persistent over time. In this paper, we revisit the impact of income per capita on democracy using the system-GMM method, which is developed to correct the weak instrument problem encountered by the di¤erence-GMM method. Using the same data set as that employed by AJRY (2008), we …nd that income per capita has a positive and highly signi…cant impact on democracy, thus reversing their results. Given that it is impossible to conduct a controlled experiment on this topic, studies have to rely on the examination of non-randomized, secondary data with somewhat imperfect estimation methodologies. Nonetheless, the results we obtain using the system-GMM method -a method arguably better than its di¤erence-GMM alternative for dealing with the potential endogeneity problem in panel data -add more weight for acceptance of the modernization theory, i.e., that economic development promotes democracy. For more information, please refer to the original paper (Bond, 2002) . Note: *** represents the statistical significance at 1% level. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses.
τ t-1 is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if democracy is below the sample mean and 0 otherwise. 
